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Determinantsof the Outcome
of Phase III Episodes
Thenature of the devaluation packages, the initial responses to those
packages, and the behavior of export earnings with respect to altered real
EERs and other variables have now been examined. This chapter will consider
one of the basic questions underlying the entire NBER project: What factors
determine whether a country undertaking a devaluation and liberalization of
its trade and payments regime is likely to enter upon a period of sustained and
continuing liberalization in Phase IV or whether it will reenter Phase II?
The question of the determinants of whether Phase IV will be sustained is
logically separate from issues relating to the benefits of the Phase IV regime
for two reasons. First, countries embarking on Phase III episodes have
presumably already determined that alteration of the trade and payments
regime is desirable (or unavoidable). Second, if it is possible to identify the ef-
fects of various measures on the probability of sustained liberalization and
estimate the costs of those measures, countries can weigh these estimates
against estimates of the benefits and decide whether the attempt is wor-
thwhile.' The benefits of successful devaluations—that is, those resulting in
Phase IV regimes—upon economic growth, per capita income, income
distribution, and other desiderata of policy are the subject of Part IV of this
volume. Judgment as to whether an attempt to liberalize is worthwhile cannot
be considered until the benefit, as well as the cost, side of the equation is
estimated.
The first section of this chapter surveys the Phase III successes and
failures among the ten study countries. There are a number of conditions sur-
rounding a devaluation which inevitably affect its prospects for success and
make the transition difficult; those considerations are the subject of the second
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In general, growth of export earnings is a necessary condition for a sus-
tained Phase IV or V trade and payments regime. While such growth can result
in part from chance, it usually requires a realistic real exchange rate for ex-
ports and reasonable assurance that such a rate will be maintained. The third
section of this chapter considers two ways in which these conditions can be
achieved: (1) demand management policies can be used to contain the level of
aggregate demand so that the domestic rate of inflation does not exceed the
world rate; or (2) a policy can be adopted—either the sliding peg or adjust-
ment of export subsidies—under which the real EER is maintained, in spite of
a higher rate of inflation in the home country than in the rest of the world.
Generally, it seems preferable to adopt a sliding peg, which can be effective
regardless of whether demand management is successful.
Even if the real EER is maintained over a long interval, a successful move
to Phase IV requires reallocation of resources in accordance with the shift in
incentives in the domestic economy. That requires a period during which the
altered bias of the regime is maintained before foreign exchange earnings start
growing. In that interval, which may be longer or shorter, depending in part
upon past history, the country must be able to sustain the liberalization and
bias reduction; this, in turn, implies that either the demand for imports must
shift downward or the flow of imports must increase. There are, in general,
two ways of bridging this interval: either foreign credits can increase the flow
of imports, or domestic recession can cut back the demand for imports. The
trade-off between various means of maintaining the regime in the transition
period and other aspects of macroeconomic policy are the subject of the final
section of this chapter.
I. SUCCESSES AND FAILURES
The only criterion for "success" used at this point is whether a sustained
Phase IV liberalization followed each Phase III episode. This begs the question
of how long Phase IV must have lasted in order to judge the liberalization as
having been "sustained." It was seen in Chapter 9 that there were only four
cases where liberalization was maintained in the longer run. Here, focus is on
intermediate-term success.
A simple count shows that there were eight Phase III episodes that
reverted to Phase II without any intervening Phase IV period. Those eight in-
stances—Brazil in 1957 and 1961, Chile in 1956 and 1965, Colombia in 1962,
Egypt in 1962, India in 1966, and South Korea in 1961—must be judged clear-
cut failures. At the opposite extreme there weresix instances of Phase III
episodes that were followed by Phase IVs lasting five or more years; these in-
cluded Brazil in 1964, Colombia in 1967, Israel in 1952 and 1962, South Korea
in 1964, and the Philippines in 1960. Israel's 1962 episode is peculiar, but it220 DETERMINANTS OF THE OUTCOME OF PHASE III
will nonetheless be regarded as a success. In addition, the Philippine and
Turkish devaluations of 1970 were followed by Phase IV regimes that lasted to
late 1974, and therefore can be placed in the intermediate-term "success"
group. One other devaluation must almost certainly be classed as a success:
Turkey in 1958, where Phase IV lasted for four years, and the restrictiveness of
the remaining exchange controls was substantially reduced.
In the five remaining instances—Chile in 1959, Ghana in 1967, and Co-
lombia in 1951, 1957, and 1965—Phase IV followed Phase III, but it was
short-lived. In the first three of these cases, an important factor in maintaining
Phase IV was an improvement in the price of a major exportable, which in-
creased foreign exchange earnings without a significant change in the volume
of exports. While those instances resulted in some liberalization for a time, it is
probably preferable for present purposes to lump them with the "failures"
because exogenous factors primarily supported whatever liberalization did oc-
cur, and domestic resources were not reallocated on any sustained basis.
Altogether there are thirteen instances deemed failures and nine that can
be termed successes in an intermediate-term perspective. As mentioned in
Chapter 9, any "count" is biased in that Phase III occurs again only after
"failure." Nonetheless, in a large number of cases devaluation and the
measures accompanying it did not bring about more temporary changes. The
important question is what factors determined the success or failure of these
Phase III efforts.
II. THE INITIAL TRANSITION PERIOD
Background to Devaluation
In general, Phase III starts at a time when foreign exchange reserves have been
depleted, additional foreign credits are available only at unacceptable terms,
and debt rescheduling is essential. In addition, exports and other sources of
foreign exchange earnings are often declining—or atleastrising very
slowly—because of the erosion of the real exchange rate and perhaps also
because future exchange rate changes are anticipated. The scarcity of foreign
exchange has usually resulted in a predevaluation flow of imports well below
that desired by the authorities, even after taking into account industrialization
and other domestic goals. In fact, in many instances the predevaluation flow
of imports is well below the level that would be desired even at an equilibrium
exchange rate.
At the time the devaluation is undertaken, therefore, the economy is often
import-starved and a near-crisis atmosphere prevails. That situation itself
creates a number of difficult problems:
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1. Rational decisionmaking is not necessarily done best under the impetus
of crisis. The crisis atmosphere necessarily makes it difficult to put together an
appropriate set of policy measures. In addition, public discussion of the op-
tions surrounding devaluation is a virtual impossibility because of the currency
speculation that would thereby be encouraged.
2. Partly as a consequence of the underlying economic situation, but also
for other reasons, opposition political groups may find the devaluation a focal
point for political attack upon the government and use it to rally support
against the government. Even if the threat of such action does not deter a
country's leaders, the result of such opposition is to weaken the government
just at the time decisive action is necessary, when the government must be able
to convince individual economic units that its liberalization program will suc-
ceed.
3. Expectationsthatliberalizationwillnot continue may leadto
speculative inventory build-ups that drain foreign exchange holdings. Against
the background of foreign exchange shortage and importscarcities,
eliminating the premium on import licenses may be a sine qua non for any
chance of success. Even then it may be only after the government has main-
tained the liberalization over a period of several months that expectations of
continued liberalization will form. During that period, speculation against
future import licensing restrictions may generate an above-normal demand for
imports.
4. Liberalizing imports immediately requires financing. The exchange
rate change itself will usually not be large enough to absorb all premiums on
import licenses, and export earnings cannot be relied upon to increase im-
mediately. Liberalization beyond the amount permitted by the exchange rate
change can be achieved only if some source of support for an increased flow of
imports can be found, if income falls, or if tariffs increase. Moreover, debt
rescheduling is often an urgent necessity, and a prior condition, for any
satisfactory resolution of the payments problem.
EXPECTATIONS
This list of problems is formidable in the best of circumstances, but dif-
• ficulties are likely to be all the more pronounced, the more frequent have been
unsuccessful Phase III episodes in the past. That leads to the first proposition
about the probability of successful transition to Phase IV: successful transition
will be easier, quicker, and less costly—all else being equal—in those countries
where past Phase III episodes have been successful. Conversely, transition to a
sustained Phase IV will be most difficult in those situations where there are
past histories of repeated, unsuccessful Phase III episodes.
Initially such a proposition may sound self-contradictory—successful
Phase III episodes are less likely to end in an exchange control situation that
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will eventually require another Phase III episode. Yet several countries in the
project had exactly that experience. The Philippines, for example, enjoyed sus-
tained liberalization and then a Phase V regime for years after her 1960
devaluation; in 1969, excessive government expenditures and money creation
resulted in huge excess demand pressures, and exchange controls were rein-
troduced, reinaugurating a Phase II regime. When the government devalued
and liberalized in 1970, the reaction was remarkably fast, and the Philippines
quickly reestablished a very liberal trade and payments regime. The Turkish
devaluation of 1970 may have been somewhat similar. Despite the fact that
Turkey had a fairly strong bias toward import substitution, the 1958 devalua-
tion was followed by a long period of export growth as the real export EER
was maintained at satisfactory levels. After the 1970 devaluation, memories of
the success of the 1958 devaluation in drying up import license premiums and
in liberalizing the regime undoubtedly helped in a smooth transition to
Phase IV.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, all three of the Latin American
countries covered by the project had a history of devaluations between which
exchange control regimes persisted. In all three, therefore, it was to be ex-
pected that responses to altered real exchange rates would be slow, partly
because the new rates were not expected to last. In the Brazilian case, as
Fishlow notes, there was a mild tendency toward greater liberalization and
smaller bias in the regime even prior to the 1964 devaluation; despite that, a
protracted Phase III period followed. Likewise, Behrman concludes that Chile
would experience significant difficulties in attempting to liberalize.
Given three liberalization and four stabilization failures in less than two decades,
cynicism about the probability of success of any gradual attempt is liable to kill it
before longer-run benefits appear.
Behrmantherefore concludes that, in the Chilean case, a sharp and abrupt
transition would be desirable to improve the chances that expectations would
be altered. The question of whether there should be a gradual or an abrupt
transition depends on a large number of factors, but a sharp, sudden switch
appears to be more justified, the more difficult it appears to be to alter expec-
tations.•
POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The transition to Phase IV is certain to be accompanied by some dif-
ficulties. They may or may not be the outgrowth of the devaluation program,
but the program will nonetheless be blamed for whatever goes wrong. In India,
for example, devaluation was preceded and followed by exceptionally poor
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the devaluation; Bhagwati and Srinivasan's estimates indicate that the entire
increase in prices of food grains can be explained by the poor harvest, income
behavior, and other variables not directly connected with the devaluation.
Apart from exogenous shocks, some dislocation is an inevitable by-
product of devaluation. If import-substitution becomes less profitable—as it
must—some entrepreneurs are bound to suffer reduced profits, if not losses.
Price increases, even if they result from past inflationary pressures, may lower
the real incomes of one or more segments of the community. Simultaneously,
merchant importers are almost certain to be worse off. Reduction in the
variance in differential incentives will also adversely affect some industries and
sectors. These difficulties will be more easily handled if there is political con-
sensus about the desirability of the liberalization, for then opposition will be
more muted and less able to reverse the liberalization program before it has a
chance to produce longer-term results.3
The same considerations suggest that a strong government is more likely
to be able to carry out a devaluation and liberalization program than will a
weak government, although the fact is, of course, that some packages are
more politically palatable than others. The Brazilian government, for exam-
ple, was strong when it embarked on the liberalization and inflation-reduction
program in 1964, andundoubtedly a weaker government could not have
withstood the political pressures resulting from the recession. Fishlow argues,
however, that it would have been possible to achieve the same degree of
liberalization and to shift incentives from import substitution to export pro-
motion without the very drastic deflationary measures that accompanied
Phase III. Thus, while it is true that the Brazilian government had to be firmly
in power to carry out the transition the way it did, it does not automatically
follow that a somewhat weaker government could not have followed an alter-
native path of transition to Phase IV.
The desirability of political consensus is also illustrated by an opposite
sort of experience—that of Turkey in 1958. There was widespread agreement
that the inflation Turkey was then experiencing was intolerable and had to be
stopped. Meanwhile, the Menderes government had been forced to accept an
IMF-imposed stabilization program, including ceilings on government expen-
ditures and bank credits, in order to receive foreign credits to support the
liberalization of imports in August 1958. Itis reasonably evident that the
government's acceptance of those conditions was based on its dependence on
foreign loans, rather than its underlying convictions. In mid-1959, therefore,
the government started violating IMF-imposed ceilings, and the inflationary
pressures of earlier years began to reemerge. Partly in consequence, there was
a widely supported coup in May of 1960, and successive governments
thereafter were committed to the goal of price stability and rational manage-
ment of aggregate demand.PREDEVALUATION INFLATIONARY PRESSURES
Macroeconomic considerations play a great part in determining which set
of policy instruments is most appropriate to a specific Phase III situation. In-
flationary pressures, in particular, are an important element in shaping the
character of the Phase III situation itself. That is because the emergence or
224 DETERMINANTS OF THE OUTCOME OF PHASE III
It does not seem possible to draw any simple conclusion about the impor-
tance of political consensus. The Philippine government of 1960, for example,
cannot be characterized as having been overly strong, nor can the South
Korean government of 1964, despite the later evolution of those two regimes.
Conversely it would appear that the Ghanaian government of 1967 and the
Brazilian government of 1957 were both at least as strong as several other
governments where the Phase III episode was successful.
It is possible to say that exogenous events have a strong impact, either off-
setting or enhancing economic discontent. All else equal, successful transition
to Phase IV will be more likely, the more favorable are such exogenous events
as changes in the country's terms of trade and harvest conditions. While these•
cannot always be forecast, weather conditions usually are known, and it is also
possible to wait until information becomes available. Terms of trade changes
are perhaps more difficult to foresee. A good harvest helps in several ways. It
increases real incomes in rural areas and also in those urban sectors that service
agriculture; it helps to prevent prices from increasing too much, partly offset-
ting any tendency toward inflation that might result from devaluation; and
good crops usually permit greater exports, which in turn finance more im-
ports. Favorable changes in the terms of trade have comparable consequences.
The potential real income of the country is increased, and any such increase
can be employed to finance additional imports. All of these favorable factors
reduce the number and magnitude of injurious side-effects of devaluation and
dampen adverse political reaction to it.
In general it would appear that transition to Phase IV is easier against a
background of rapid growth of real income and of increases in the import
flow. More rapid growth of real income may lessen the dislocations associated
with resource reallocation, thereby reducing political discontent, while greater
benefits from additional imports may be a visible "good" effect of devalua-
tion. This points to a conclusion that has emerged repeatedly: the process of
transition will be easier, and therefore more likely to result in sustained
liberalization, if import flows increase following devaluation; if devaluation
must be accompanied by a cut in real imports, it will be much more difficult.
Many of the Latin American Phase III "failures" started at a time when im-
ports were high and had to be reduced. The belt-tightening that is necessary for
success of devaluation with a convertible currency—but makes it so pain-
ful—was therefore an important concomitant of those devaluations and made
them more difficult to handle politically.
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severe intensification of excess demand prior to, or at the time of, devaluation
is very likely to be fatal to the devaluation program. Moreover, such an in-
crease in pressures is also very likely to result in a heightened rate of inflation
following devaluation, itself sufficient to erode the alteration in the real ex-
change rate.
Perhaps more important is that excess demand within the domestic
economy at the time of devaluation is very likely to slow down the process of
resource reallocation compared to the adjustment time if domestic demand
were appropriately managed. That consideration, of course, is closely related
to the role of expectations: at a time when the rate of price increase is ac-
celerating, businessmen have difficulty in distinguishing changes in relative
prices from movements in the aggregate price level.
In the real world one never finds ideal conditions. While it would be folly
for a government to wait for the conjunction of preexisting stable demand, im-
proved terms of trade, and a favorable harvest, a devaluation when the inverse
conditions coincided would be exceptionally unfortunate. Thus, while judg-
ment always has to be used in deciding upon timing, it can be argued that if it
appears that the trade and payments regime will have to be altered anyway
within, say, an eighteen-month period, the decision as to whether 'to act this
year or wait until next year might be based on the crop outlook and on the
state of world demand for the country's major exports. Given the difficulty
that unsuccessful Phase III episodes create for future attempts to alter the
trade and payments regime, it may well be that prolonging the economic costs
of Phase II until underlying conditions are more favorable for a Phase III ef-
fori can be justified by the higher probability of ultimately achieving a suc-
cessful transition to Phase IV. Of course, demand conditions are not entirely
exogenous insofar as the government makes decisions concerning monetary
and fiscal policies. A decision to postpone exchange rate realignment in hopes
of better conditions at a later date should be accompanied by relatively restric-
tive demand-management policies if chances of success are to be improved.
Among the countries included in this project, Ghana appears to have had
the most favorable initial conditions. Macroeconomic policy had already been
deflationary for a year; the world price of cocoa was rising rapidly; and, as far
as can be judged, the government seems to have had little opposition to its
policies. Yet the Ghanaian liberalization effort failed for a number of reasons.
Chief among them was the government's highly expansionary monetary and
fiscal policies under a fixed exchange rate in the several years following
devaluation. Indeed, the extent to which initial conditions were favorable is in-
dicated by the length of time that liberalization was sustained despite the fact
that the real exchange rate had returned to its predevaluation level within two
years of the Phase Ill episode. Had underlying conditions been less auspicious,
the Ghanaian government would have been forced to resume Phase II controls
at a much earlier date than, in fact, happened.226 DETERMINANTS OF THE OUTCOME OF PHASE tIl
The Indian devaluation represents the opposite situation; initial condi-
tions and exogenous events were exceptionally unfavorable. It is virtually im-
possible to conceive of a set of policies that could have permitted a transition
to Phase IV in view of the droughts and poor harvests that preceded and
followed devaluation. The poor crops were inevitably going to reeduce sup-
plies available for export, increase import requirements, and.raise domestic
prices for food grains. In view of those circumstances it can be argued that In-
dia's Phase III episode was doomed even if the government's commitment to
liberalization had been considerably stronger than it was.
Role of Foreigners
Accumulated debt service obligations often were the proximate factor trig-
gering a devaluation decision. In many instances, countries not only reschedul-
ed and postponed existing debts but also borrowed additional funds to finance
the increased flow of imports that supported the liberalization.It will be
argued that additional borrowing is the alternative to greater domestic reces-
sion (or less liberalization) and can have a high rate of return. At present, the
focus is on a somewhat different aspect: the role of foreigners in forcing the
devaluation decision and the effect of their preparation on the prospects for a
sustained liberalization.
Because borrowing enables a Phase II regime to survive longer than would
otherwise be the case, it is not surprising that foreign debt and foreign borrow-
ing are a part of most devaluation experiences. The analogy to personal
finance is useful: an individual can live beyond his means for a period of time
by borrowing to finance consumption, but if he does not voluntarily reduce his
consumption below his income level at some point, his creditors will begin to
demand repayment or impose steeper terms on additional borrowing; if spen-
ding beyond income continues, the creditors are forced to demand payment.
Creditors are unpopular in such circumstances and that fate has often befallen
the international agencies that have insisted on devaluation and other
measures as a prerequisite for debt rescheduling or additional loans.
Despite foreign involvement in so many devaluations, few generalizations
emerge. In some instances, foreigners were invited in, as with the Klein-Saks
mission to Chile in 1956, and yet resentment was considerable. Behrman
reported that
the identification of the 1956-58 attempt in particular with foreign interests
discredited this program in the eyes of many Chileans. In part this identification
was with official foreign agencies, especially the IMF. Much more of this iden-
tification, however, was associated with Klein-Saks. ... Subsequentcriticisms of
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net result has been an overemphasis on the role this mission actually played, and
further avoidance of the basic underlying issues.4
In contrast, foreign creditors played a sizable role in the Turkish devalua-
tion of 1958, and yet there was strong popular backing for the stabilization
program. In India the negative political reaction to the role of foreigners was
so strong that Bhagwati and Srinivasan devote a lar5e portion of their analysis
to it. Political attacks on devaluation centered on the role of foreigners in forc-
ing it and ignored the fact that the economic arguments for devaluation in In-
dia were overwhelming—and probably had been so for several years. In Col-
ombia the President even went on national television to announce that he
would not yield to foreign pressures. On the other hand, foreign participation
does not seem to have been an issue in Ghana, the Philippines, or South
Korea.
Although political reaction to devaluation is inevitable, it seems clear that
foreign identification with the devaluation decision provides a focal point for
the government's critics, providing a far stronger and emotionally more ap-
pealing case than would otherwise be possible. It is also possible that domestic
politicians may find it to their advantage to claim that foreigners "forced"
them to devalue, although yielding to foreign pressures is not always a
politically acceptable stance either, as was the case in India.
It is tempting to conclude that creditor countries ought not to "force" or
"urge" a devaluation and should wait until domestic political pressures are
backing it. This has happened on occasion when countries have sought loans
and have been turned down. On other occasions, donors have chosen terribly
poor timing, even though they were fundamentally correct in insisting upon
devalution. DIaz, for example, believes that the exchange rate changes which
were being urged upon Colombia in 1966 would have been badly timed had
they been carried out then.5 In retrospect the timing of the Indian devaluation
was disastrous and—at a minimum—it can be argued that a delay of several
months until the probable size of the harvest was known would have been well
warranted.
The difficulty with urging creditors to abstain from insisting upon
devaluation is that their very refusal to extend new credits can provide a suffi-
cient lever to force action—the donors are as trapped as the recipients. The
logical corollary would be for creditors to accede to all requests for debt
postponement and new loans; but that position is clearly untenable. While it is
natural for borrowing countries to resent pressures on the part of the lenders,
it is equally understandable that lenders cannot be expected to extend addi-
tional credits indefinitely in the face of inherently untenable payments situa-
tions. This is not to say that lenders have always been sufficiently reticent in
their policy proposals: in many instances it seems evident that creditors may
have been too eager to "assist" in policymaking and to formulate devaluation228 DETERMINANTS OF THE OUTCOME OF PHASE HI
packages when a simple refusal to consider additional credit as proposed
would have been sufficient.
Overall the appropriate conclusion seems to be that strained lender/donor
relations are an inevitable cost of exchange control regimes. If those regimes
are sustained by foreign loans that are not productive, it is unavoidable that
the borrowing cannot continue indefinitely, and its termination will necessarily
be accompanied by some change in the trade and payments regime. Tensions
between lenders and borrowers will invariably accompany severe exchange
controls, even if creditors behave with complete circumspection. Resentments
will certainly be greater when the devaluation liberalization effort results in
stronger economic dislocations domestically and a reversion to Phase II. They
are likely to be lessened when the strains of transition are smaller and when
liberalization succeeds.
GradualversusAbrupt Transition
One of the most difficult questions about how the transition to Phase IV and V
can be accomplished is the rate at which relative price signals should be chang-
ed. On one hand, a "small" initial liberalization and reduction in bias may
facilitate later moves in that direction and reinforce expectations that the
alteration is permanent. Moreover, if a "big" change turned out to be more
than could be sustained, any small reversal might trigger expectations of a
move back to QRs, which would then be self-fulfilling. On the other hand, a
"big" initial change may be desirable to jolt producers into changing their
behavior. Slow changes may simply prolong the period of transition and in-
crease the costs of the change; in turn the political reaction to the transition
period may mount over time.
Behrman concluded that for Chile, with her past history of failure, a
quick and "large" change would provide the best chance of success. Michaely
also believes that it was the size of the change in Israel that was important in its
success. The Turkish devaluation of 1958 represents yet another instance in
which the change was large; its very magnitude helped shift expectations and
speed reactions to the new set of relative prices. In a few instances, too little
change doomed the endeavor; the Indian devaluation was certainly too small
to have any hope of shifting signals enough to provide promise of long-term
results.
Yet there can be little doubt that very large changes in relative prices are
severe shocks to the economy and may result in dislocations that are in-
tolerable. Such appears to have been the case after the Ghanaian devaluation
of December 1971, when the price of a dollar was increased from NC 1.02 to
NC1 .82. Within two months a military coup had overthrown the government
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There probably can be no general conclusion on the matter. Relative price
changes of 25 percent and more are obviously very large. Yet when past infla-
tions have reduced the relative price of exportables by even more than that,
some means of raising that price must be found if bias is to be significantly
altered. The appeal of the sliding-peg policy is that, once adopted, large
relative price changes to correct currency overvaluation induced by inflation
under exchange controls are no longer necessary. However, for even a sliding-
peg policy to work, the real exchange rate must be realistically valued at the
outset; there must be an initial change—either gradual or abrupt—to establish
appropriate real rates.
There is no easy way out of the dilemma. Once exchange controls have in-
sulated an economy for a sustained period of time from the exchange rate
changes that would otherwise have been necessary, it is inevitable that a large
adjustment in relative prices will be needed if QRs are not to resume. However
that large adjustment is achieved, there will be costs involved. Given the dif-
ficulties of maintaining new relative prices during the transition period, it
seems doubtful that there is any wisdom in starting with a "too-small" ex-
change rate change; future changes may become even more difficult politically
once the transition is begun. The lesson is, of course, that even in Phase II an
overvaluation should not be permitted to reach the point where such large
changes might later be necessary. Once QRs are that severe, the attempt to
remove them is bound to entail high costs.
III. MACROECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES
The great majority of Phase III episodes were aimed at simultaneously reduc-
ing the rate of domestic inflation and liberalizing the trade and payments
regime. Significant shifts in monetary and fiscal policy were undertaken in an
effort to achieve the first goal, and the exchange rate was changed to a new,
fixed parity as part of the set of policies designed to achieve the second. The
implications of such a combination of policies are obvious: If the program to
reduce inflation to something near the rate of increase in world prices is not
successful, the real exchange rate will appreciate, and it will be impossible to
sustain the liberalization for longer than foreign exchange reserves, new bor-
rowing sources, and good fortune permit.
Even when stabilizing domestic prices is the foremost object of policy, it
still makes little sense to tie the outcome of the liberalization effort to the fate
of domestic prices, although it was done in many instances. However, only in
four cases were countries successful in cutting their inflation rates sharply:
Brazil after 1964, Israel after 1952, South Korea after 1964, and Turkey afterInadequate Real Exchange Rates
Twelve of the thirteen "failures" represent instances where, even after
devaluation, the real exchange rate was too overvalued to permit sustained
liberalization. The thirteenth case, Egypt, was the one in which there was
almost no net devaluation but inflation eroded the real exchange rate in the
several years after devaluation.
Of the twelve cases, there are three distinct, but interrelated, paths to
failure, and some countries' efforts would have failed on more than one score.
In a few cases the real exchange rate was probably set at an appropriate level
until the price of a major export declined. That happened in Colombia after
1951, and it was a contributory factor in Chile after 1965 and in Ghana in the
late 1960s. Certainly the high price of the exportables in question could not
reasonably have been maintained, so that the real rate was probably over-
valued in a long-run sense, but liberalization could, and did, continue until the
terms of trade deteriorated.
The second pattern is similar to the first, except that temporary conditions
never masked the fundamental problem; the real exchange rate was not in-
creased enough and the devaluation was "too small." Behrman believes this to
have been true of all three of Chile's devaluations.7 India's 1966 devaluation
was, for all intents and purposes, insufficient to do more than reduce the
degree of overvaluation by a fraction. Brazil's 1957 devaluation failed to
remove the bias against exports, and the Brazilian authorities began taking
corrective steps only in 1959.
In the majority of cases, however, the real exchange rate appears to have
been set at a level not unrealistic at the time of devaluation—the rate of infla-
tion in the period following devaluation simply washed out the real change
'I
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1958. Interestingly enough, a sliding peg or floating rate accompanied these
successes in reducing inflation in Brazil and South Korea, and, after 1966,
Israel began changing export EERs through export incentive schemes in order
to maintain the real exchange rate. Adopting some policy to sustain the real
rate is quite consistent either with reducing the inflation rate or with failing to
do so; it certainly does not follow that devaluing with the stated intent of
maintaining the real exchange rate implies that inflation will not be controlled.
It seems best to start by diagnosing the liberalization efforts that failed
because of erosion of the real exchange rate. Thereafter, the experiences of
countries with the sliding peg or other means of maintaining the real exchange
rate in the face of domestic inflation can be evaluated. Lastly, although it is
aside from the central focus of the project, it seems worthwhile to examine
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that had occurred. The data in Table 5-3 support this observation. Inspection
of the PLD-EER two years after devaluation indicates that the real rate had
appreciated in fourteen instances. In eight of these cases the real exchange rate
was, lower two years after devaluation than it had been one year before; this
happened in Brazil in 1961 and 1964, Chile in 1959, Colombia in 1957/58 and
1962, Egypt in 1962, Israel in 1962, and South Korea in 1961.8 Indeed, it is not
entirely obvious that inspection of an indexed series of real exchange rates
would reveal the year in which devaluation took place. In all but one of the
thirteen failures the real exchange rate appreciated; the exception was the Col-
ombian devaluation of 1965, in which the real exchange rate had already fallen
to its 1964 level by 1966—the devaluation in 1967 obscures that fact in Table
5-3.
There are thus cases in which the Phase III episodes would have
foundered even if one of two problems had been eliminated. Thus, Brazil's
1957 devaluation was doomed to fail because inflation would quickly erode the
improvement in the real exchange rate, but in addition the devaluation was so
small that, even with stable prices, the liberalization could not have lasted. To
be sure, either a larger initial devaluation or a slower rate of inflation would
probably have allowed more improvement in foreign exchange earnings and
permitted a greater amount, or a longer period, of liberalization.
Nonetheless the conclusions are obvious: failure to devalue by a sufficient
margin will prevent sustained liberalization; and inflation after devaluation at
a fixed exchange rate will prevent sustained liberalization. A realistic real ex-
change rate was set forth earlier as an essential condition for sustained
liberalization, but what was not so evident was the role that domestic inflation
had played in preventing its continuation.
j
The Sliding Peg as a Way Out
At first glance it would appear that a country might choose among several
alternative means of maintaining a viable real exchange rate: (1) it could an-
ticipate its future rate of inflation and devalue enough so that the average real
exchange rate would be appropriate over a period of five years or so; (2) it
could control domestic inflation; or (3) it could try to maintain a constant real
rate by frequent formal or informal adjustment of effective exchange rates.
The first alternative might be viable if a country's rate of inflation seemed
to be within 5 percent or so of the world rate. If a country's rate of inflation
exceeded the world rate by 10 percent or more, the change in the real exchange
rate that would be required to maintain a proper five-year average rate would
probably entail very large resource reallocation costs. For example, if inflation
were expected to exceed the world rate by 10 percent annually, and a country
planned to devalue every five years by enough to restore the average real rate,232 DETERMINANTS OF THE OUTCOME OF PHASE III
unacceptable fluctuations in the real rate and drastic exchange rate alterations
would be required; it would have to devalue approximately 60 percent every
five years. Even then anticipation of that rate of devaluation would lead to
speculative pressures, preventing implementation of the policy.
The inflation-control alternative is, of course, a possibility. In general,
however, countries have not been assured that they could control future infla-
tion rates, and, even when they could, it has taken several years of declining
rates before a new, lower rate of inflation was achieved. Thus, Brazil's attain-
ment of a 15 percent rate was preceded by several years of higher, but declin-
ing, rates of inflation.
The third alternative is to adopt a policy of altering the effective exchange
rate, through any of several techniques, in order to maintain a relatively cons-
tant real exchange rate. Such a policy is not at all inconsistent with controlling
domestic inflation: as domestic price increases diminish, the size of adjustment
in EERs can be reduced commensurately. There are, in effect, three techniques
that can be employed to achieve the third alternative: (1) the exchange rate
could be permitted to float; (2) the authorities could alter the nominal ex-
change rate by small amounts with great frequency; and (3) various ad hoc ex-
port incentives and import charges could be levied and .changed periodically
between devaluations.
The first method, floating the exchange rate, has been used on occasion,
as in the Philippines for a short time in 1970 and in South Korea for several in-
tervals after 1964. Such a procedure is perfectly satisfactory, but it requires a
fairly realistic domestic interest rate policy to counteract incentives for lending
and borrowing abroad. For example, a country might be experiencing 10 per-
cent. inflation annually with a 12 percent nominal interest rate, while the rest of
the world had no inflation and an 8 percent interest rate; investors, an-
ticipating 10 percent depreciation annually, would expect to earn—in terms of
domestic currency—a nominal rate of return of 18 percent abroad compared
with 12 percent at home, and thus capital flows would be induced.
The second method—the sliding peg—entails frequent small adjustments
in the exchange rate. The time period between those adjustments must be suffi-
ciently brief so thaat there is no incentive for speculation against the exchange
rate changes. The advantage of the sliding peg is that it pemits control of
capital flows and thus can insulate the economy from the detrimental effects
of domestic real interest rates that are not aligned with world rates. The central
bank buys and sells foreign exchange at the announced rate so that, in effect,
the rate is pegged.
The third method, which involves adjusting the informal components of
the exchange rate between devaluations, is similar to the second, except that
there is more variance among the EERs extended to different categories of
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Little needs to be said here about the possibility of floating the exchange
rate. While theory suggests that such a policy is probably optimal, assuming a
satisfactory money market, no country in the project adopted it over a long
period. It was chiefly used to let the market serve as a guide to the appropriate
level for a new fixed rate, even when that rate was later to be adjusted in accor-
dance with price level changes.
The sliding peg is probably best thought of as a "second best" alternative
in a country where there are many distortions, especially in the money market.
Even then there is no assurance that the same real exchange rate will necessari-
ly be appropriate over long intervals of time.9 It is possible, however, to allow
adjustments in the nominal rate that are greater or smaller than those dictated
by the price level, depending on the behavior of the balance of payments. It is
apparent that a real exchange rate can be maintained by a sliding peg, but that,
in itself, is no guarantee against overvaluation—the importance of a realistic
rate is by no means diminished. Indeed, the Chilean experience after 1965
seems to be a perfect example of a country that adopted a sliding peg but did
not select a realistic level at which to hold that rate. '°
Asidefrom Chile, two other countries—Brazil and Colombia—adopted
the sliding peg. South Korea alternated between floating rates, the sliding peg,
and adjustments of informal components of the exchange rate. Israel also used
the informal adjustment methodafter 1966.'
Table 10-1 gives data for the three Latin American countries on real ex-
change rates and fluctuations in them over the time period when these coun-
tries had a sliding-peg policy. The nominal exchange rates are given in the first
two columns; the third indicates the frequency with which the exchange rate
was changed. Since data were recorded on a monthly basis, twelve changes per
year are the maximum that could be indicated, and there may have been
periods when Colombia or Chile changed the nominal rate more than once in a
one-month period. As can be seen, Brazil tended to alter the exchange rate at
intervals of six weeks to two and one-half months, while Chilean and Colom-
bian changes were more frequent. The Brazilians, in fact, changed their ex-
change rate according to a formula which was designed to keep their PPP-
PLD-EER constant in terms of eight trading partners; thus, the fluctuations
shown in Table 10-1 reflect changes in other currencies relative to the dollar
and differential rates of inflation among Brazil's trading partners.
These fluctuations in the real rates, while noticeable, are far smaller than
was experienced at other times by the same countries under fixed rates. While
it cannot be said that constant real rates would have been optimal, there is cer-
tainly no presumption that the fluctuations in the real exchange rate should be
linked in any way to the increase in the rate of inflation—yet that is precisely
what happens under a fixed exchange rate. The sliding peg—at least in the
three countries covered here—has substantially reduced the variance in the real
exchange rate, although not to a level lower than might be experienced by a
low-inflation country.
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Table 10-1.Exchange Rates, Nominal and Price-Adjusted, Three Sliding-Peg

































































































































Note: The price indexes are on a 1967 base.
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics. For Brazil—Line 64 was used as deflator, since
the other price series are broken; for Chile and Colombia—Line 63a was used as price deflator.
In all three cases, each alteration of the exchange rate was of sufficiently
small magnitude that speculation against exchange rate changes was not likely
to be very profitable.2 In Brazil, exchange rate alterations were not made at
preannounced intervals, and most changes were only about 1.5 percent, while
the annual discount rate was 24 percent and most domestic interest rates were
even higher.
Colombia's "typical" exchange rate alteration was even smaller, ranging
from 0.33 to 0.75 percent monthly. This was a result of the fact that Colom-
bia's inflation rate was substantially lower than Brazil's, ranging from 5 to 10
percent per year compared to the Brazilian 20 percent figure. The Colombian
discount rate was 8 percent until 1970 and 14 percent thereafter, with even
higher domestic interest rates.
Chile, with the most rapid inflation of the three countries during their
respective sliding-peg periods, again kept the monthly exchange rate changes
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toaround 1.5 to 2 percent, with the discount rate in the range of 15 to 20 per-
cent. In periods of very rapid inflation, as during 1969 and 1970, the exchange
rate alterations lagged behind inflation and the real value of the escudo ap-
preciated from an already overvalued base.
There are a number of a priori grounds on which one would expect that
adjustment of the informal components of the exchange rate would prove in-
ferior to the sliding peg: (1) the smaller and more frequent changes associated
with a sliding peg may be less disruptive of economic activity; (2) the fact that
the sliding-peg policy is announced may provide greater certainty to pro-
ducers; (3) a sliding peg may be more likely to reduce the variance in incentives
among different categories of transactions and thus resemble a unified ex-
change rate in its effects; and (4) from a budgetary viewpoint, export subsidies
are likely to be a drain on the government budget with the result that export
subsidies may not keep pace with domestic inflation.
Empirically, however, there is little evidence of these types of effects in
either the Israeli or the South Korean experience. Table 10-2 gives some in-
dicators of the magnitude of inflation and subsidization for the two countries.
In both cases the governments were successful in bringing inflation rates down
from their high levels of the 1950s, but, as is evident from Table 10-2, a fixed
exchange rate without any compensating policy would have resulted in sizable
currency overvaluation.
Israel started reducing the bias of the regime in the 1950s, and that process
continued until the mid-l960s. Starting with relatively minor measures in the
early 1960s, the real export EER was raised significantly in 1966 and 1967 via
various export incentive schemes. Thereafter, as matter of deliberate policy,
export incentives were adjusted to maintain constancy of the real exchange
I
rate.
South Korea's inflation has been slightly more rapid than that of Israel,
and thus the nominal exchange rate has been changed more frequently.
Moreover, South Korea did adopt a floating exchange rate for a period after
1965 and occasionally made the sliding peg a deliberate policy. For the most
part, however, the won's exchange rate was altered in discrete jumps. Compar-
ing the second and third colums of Table 10-2 the EER for exports has been
above that for imports ever since 1961 in South Korea, whereas Israel had
some bias toward import substitution over most of the period. So throughout
the 1960s, South Korea had other strong export incentives in addition to those
provided by the exchange rate.
If one attempts to relate the South Korean and Israeli policies to a
hypothetical pure sliding-peg alternative, it is clear that the disadvantages at-
tributed to the larger, discrete changes have been present but have not been
great in magnitude. There have been greater fluctuations in the real exchange
•rate than would have occurred under a sliding peg, although government pro-
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Table10.2.Nominal, Effective, and Real Exchange Rates, Israel, 1955-1971,





Exchange Rate Imports Exports Indexa Imports Exports
Israel
1955 1.80 2.21 1.83 55 3.49 3.33
1956 1.80 2.26 2.05 60 3.77 3.42
1957 1.80 2.33 2.21 64 3.64 3.45
1958 1.80 2.35 2.37 70 3.36 3.39
1959 1.80 2.50 2.49 71 3.52 3.51
1960 1.80 2.57 2.58 75 3.42 3.44
1961 1.80 2.60 2.66 81 3.21 3.28
1962 3.00 3.47 3.02 87 3.99 3.47
1963 3.00 3.49 3.04 95 3.67 3.20
1964 3.00 3.47 3.06 100 3.47 3.06
1965 3.00 3.55 3.08 110 3.23 2.80
1966 3.00 3.59 3.27 119 3.01 2.75
1967 3.00 3.68 3.57 122 3.02 2.93
1968 3.50 4.13 4.04 124 3.33 3.26
1969 3.50 4.22 4.05 127 3.32 3.19
1970 3.50 4.42 4.49 138 3.20 3.25
1971 4.20 5.09 5.04 158 3.22 3.19
South Korea
1961 130 147 151 51 287 294
1962 130 146 151 56 261 270
1963 130 148 189 68 219 281
1964 256 247 281 91 271 310
1965 256 293 305 100 293 305
1966 271 296 323 109 272 297
1967 271 296 331 116 256 286
1968 277 303 355 125 242 283
1969 288 313 363 134 234 272
1970 311 336 397 146 231 272
1971 348 n.a. n.a. 158 n.a. n.a.
1972 392 n.a. n.a. 181 na. n.a.
n.a. =notavailable.
Sources: lsrael—Michaely, Tables 4-9 (nominal rate); 4-3 (effective rates); and A-il, col. 3
(price level). South Korea—Frank, Kim, and Westphal, Tables 3-1, cot. B, and 5.7,row1
(official rates); Tables 3-i, cot. K, and 5.7, row 3 (wholesale price index); and Tables 5.8
(export rates) and 5.9 (import rates).
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against major risks. As is documented by Michaely and Frank, Kim, and
Westphal, both the Israeli and the South Korean export subsidies created dif-
ferential incentives among various export activities, and there were un-
doubtedly some significant inefficiencies resulting from differentials among
export commodities and categories.'3
Concern about inefficiencies caused by the disparity between current and
capital account exchange rates does not appear to have been warranted in the
Israeli case. In South Korea an interest rate differential between domestic and
foreign borrowing created problems that would not have arisen under a sliding
peg.'4 The danger that export subsidies will lag behind the price level has been
realized to some extent in both South Korea and Israel. In both cases the real
rate has tended to appreciate after major exchange rate alterations. It would
appear that Israeli policy may have been geared toward a constant real rate
after 1966, but before that time erosion was obvious. In South Korea, likewise,
there was at least a 10 percent decline in the real return to exporting from 1964
and Nonetheless, in both countries there was sufficient commitment to
export performance so that major erosion in the export EER has not
materialized.
The budgetary drain resulting from export subsidization was one of the
factors accounting for South Korea's willingness to devalue. The fact that the
drain was visible was, in fact, probably a benefit of the system: the cost of ex-
port subsidization was apparent to interested groups within the government,
who exerted pressures so that the disparity in favor of exports would not
become too great. In Israel, receipts from increased import duties more than
financed export subsidies, so no fiscal drain materialized.
In both the South Korean and Israeli cases, periodic discrete devaluations
were followed by changes in export subsidy rates to maintain the profitability
of exporting to domestic producers. But the fact that the policies of those two
countries appear to have been relatively successful does not prove that export
subsidization with periodic devaluation is the optimal route. Indeed, in most
of the countries covered by the NBER project, export subsidy schemes were
limited to a small number of commodities. This limitation was partly because
of the fiscal implications of large-scale subsidies; the will to promote exports
was not strong enough to overcome them.'6 In a sense a commitment to main-
tain the real exchange rate via export subsidies requires a continuing set of
policy decisions, while measures such as a sliding peg are fairly automatic after
the initial decision is made. Only in cases where the government is able to act
decisively, quickly, and with continuity can the discrete subsidy devaluation
route become a viable alternative to the sliding peg. Even then it is hard to see
why the sliding peg cannot work as well or better.238 DETERMINANTS OF THE OUTCOMEOF PHASEIII
CONTROLLING INFLATION
Because the origins of inflation generally lie in domestic political and
economic considerations, a strong argument can be made that the foreign
trade regime should not be made a function of those particular conflicts. Since
inflation imposes substantial costs, it seems clear that efforts will be made to
reduce it when it is politically possible to do so. Thus, it would seem that in
most instances a realistic starting point would be to assume that inflation will
likely continue. Should either a sliding peg or ad hoc export subsidies be used
as the means to avoid the severe foreign trade costs of domestic inflation,
those policies would automatically adjust themselves in the event inflation
were eliminated.
Even in instances when inflation control was the primary objective of
policy, it is difficult to see why a sliding peg would not have facilitated achieve-
ment of the goal during the transition period. However, it is worth reviewing
the lessons that emerged from the experience of those countries that
simultaneously set out both to liberalize their regimes and to control inflation.
Altogether there are four success stories: Brazil in 1964, Israel in 1952, South
Korea in 1964, and Turkey in 1958. Two—Brazil and South Korea—used the
sliding peg and other means to maintain their real exchange rates. Israel and
Turkey were the two countries that were experiencing high rates of inflation
and succeeded in reducing those rates sharply with fixed exchange rates. Both
the Israeli and the Turkish governments had attempted to control economic
activity through quantitative means during the period prior to the devaluation.
The resulting strains had been evident to all, and a strong consensus had
developed that continuation of the regulations could only lead to deterioration
in the situation. In both cases, also, the inflation had been fairly recent in
origin. In Israel this was because the country was newly independent; in
Turkey it was because the economic policies that led to the dislocations had
really begun only three or four years earlier. In both cases there appears to
have been some slackening in the pace of economic activity, although real
GNP continued growing.
Altering inflationary expectations probably requires a somewhat sharper
brake than does shifting resources toward export production. In most of the
cases of recession encountered in the country studies, in fact, the real villain of
the piece appears to have been the sharp cutback in the rate of increase of the
money supply. In most instances it was the attempt to control domestic infla-
tion, and not the liberalization, that resulted in slowdowns in the rate of
economic growth.
It would therefore appear that there were special circumstances that
enabled Israel and Turkey each to adopt simultaneously both anti-inflation
and liberalization programs, largely successfully. First, the inflation itself had
been relatively short-lived. Second, the government's predevaluation excesses
in attempting to
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in attempting to control economic activity had led to severe and visible losses,
and it was perhaps these extremes that made such a rapid transformation
possible. Even then it should be remembered that Israeli inflation after the
1952-1955 reform still required informal subsidization of exchange rates, and
that Turkey had reentered Phase II by the mid-1960s.
During the 1950s and 1960s the world price level was fairly stable; in the
absence of exceptional circumstances it was unrealistic for a country with even
a small inflation rate to expect to maintain a fixed nominal exchange rate. In
the mid-l970s the world inflation is considerably more rapid than during the
period covered by the project. In a sense the feasibility of adopting a fixed
nominal exchange rate may be somewhat greater now than it was earlier
because all that is required is to keep the domestic rate of inflation at, or
below, the world rate. Even so, except in countries where inflationary expecta-
tions have had little chance to form or under exceptional circumstances, it is
very doubtful whether an attempt at reducing the rate of inflation should be
coupled with liberalization efforts under a fixed nominal exchange rate. After
all, there is nothing inconsistent about having a sliding peg and a stable price
level. Indeed, in a world where many currencies are floating, the nominal ex-
change rate itself can be fixed only in terms of one currency or a basket of cur-




The Trade-off between Foreign Borrowing and Recession
Export earnings cannot be counted upon to respond sufficiently to finance
liberalization in the short run following devaluation. Foreign credits enable the
flow of imports to be increased immediately but incur a future liability for
debt servicing. In the absence of borrowing, liberalization can take place only
to the extent that: (1) the devaluation itself is sufficient to absorb the premium
on imports; (2) the central bank runs down foreign exchange reserves or has
increased foreign exchange receiptsasreverse speculative flows follow
devaluation; (3) domestic demand is reduced through tightening of monetary
and fiscal policy and other measures; and (4) tariffs are raised to replace QRs.
Since, in general, central bank reserves are already run down prior to
devaluation and the counterspeculative flows are neither large in magnitude
nor assured, the policy choice lies in deciding upon the amount of exchange
rate change, the restrictiveness of monetary and fiscal policy, the extent to
which tariffs will be increased, and the amount of foreign borrowing.
The first item to be noted is that there can be no significant social payoff
to liberalizing a regime by more than can reasonably be expected to be sustain-240 DETERMINANTSOF THE OUTCOME OF PHASE III
ed. It is highly improbable that any significant liberalization can be sustained
in a devaluation to a new, fixed exchange rate; in this case it seems doubt-
ful—except for countries with very stable price levels or extremely moderate
inflation—that borrowing to finance makes any sense. Further,
except to the extent that reduced inflation is desired to its own sake, it is doubt-
ful whether a significant slowdown in the rate of economic activity should be
tolerated. If it is a near certainty that inflation will resume as soon as economic
growth reattains a satisfactory pace, there seems to be little rationale for
reducing output in order to sustain a liberalization that can continue only as
long as domestic economic activity is depressed. Raising tariffs can, of course,
reduce reliance on QRs, but even then, if ad valorem rates are constant, excess
demand for foreign exchange will sooner or later emerge. The bias-reducing
impact of devaluation will, moreover, be smaller if tariffs are increased, and
prospects for any sustained increase in foreign exchange earnings in the in-
termediate term will be diminished.
Determination of the optimal extent of foreign borrowing and of
slowdown in the level of economic activity should properly arise in the context
of a sliding-peg policy or other means of maintaining relative constancy of the
real rate. In that circumstance it is clear there is a sound economic basis for
arguing that foreign borrowing is by far the superior instrument with which to
support liberalization and reduced bias until foreign exchange receipts begin
responding to the altered incentives provided by the regime.
The strong presumption in favor of foreign borrowing follows naturally
from the consideration that for any given amount borrowed abroad,
liberalization can be carried out to the same extent as if domestic income were
reduced by a multiple of that. This multiple is equal to the reciprocal of the
marginal propensity to import; thus, if the marginal propensity to import out
of income were 0.1, it would require a $10 reduction in domestic income to
achieve the same liberalization for a year as could be achieved by financing $1
of imports with a foreign loan. If export earnings can be expected to finance
imports after two years, the increase in real income per year that could be
achieved by borrowing $1 abroad would be somewhere between $4 and $5 for
each of those two years. It seems beyond dispute that, at any plausible interest
rate, the real return on foreign borrowing would far exceed the cost, quite
aside from whatever long-term benefits in the form of improved resource
allocation or faster growth resulted from sustained liberalization.
A government could free imports so much in the short run that the flow
could not be sustained. Such was undoubtedly the case in Turkey, where the in-
creased flow of imports in 1959 was well beyond the level that was sustainable
in the long run; this liberalization could undoubtedly have been achieved with
a smaller increase in the volume of imports.'7 Even then, some part of such an
increased flow may be required for inventory build-ups and restocking, not
just for unsustainable levels of consumption.
The lesson w
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The lesson would appear to be that transition from exchange control to
liberalization can best be achieved by adopting a sliding peg at a realistic cx-
change rate and simultaneously borrowing a quantity of foreign exchange suf-
ficient to permit an immediate liberalization of imports (to the extent that the
premium on import licenses disappears) and to assure observers that the
liberalization will continue. Foreign loans on that scale have seldom been
available to countries embarking on devaluations and liberalizations. One im-
plication from this project is that providing such loans might have a high social
product in terms of the allocation of world resources if the loans were utilized
in conjunction with a consistent program to increase foreign exchange earn-
ings and so sustain liberalization.
But even in the absence of such loans, some government policies can im-
prove chances of sustaining liberalization. First and foremost, a larger change
in the exchange rate would be necessary if import liberalization could not be
financed with credits. Such a devaluation might "overshoot" the long-term
equilibrium rate, but it could be offset if the sliding peg were adjusted by less
than the amount of price level changes once foreign exchange receipts began
growing rapidly. Whatever the disadvantages of a larger devaluation, it is pro-
bably superior to reducing domestic income levels as a means of containing im-
port demand. Only if import demand had a very high income elasticity might
income reduction be a more feasible method of supporting a liberalization ef-
fort.
The conclusion seems warranted that recession is not only an undesirable
concomitant of devaluation and liberalization efforts, it is also unnecessary
and economically inefficient. That conclusion holds when the transition is
made to a sliding peg, but it is even more true when devaluation is made to a
fixed exchange rate that in any event will be eroded by domestic inflation. The
recessions that have followed Phase III episodes in the ten project countries
have come about either through factors independent of the liberalization ef-
fort or as a result of attempts to reduce the domestic rate of inflation.
Macroeconomic Impact of Phase III
Thus far several conclusions about the macroeconomic impact of Phase Ill
have emerged: (1) the existence of a large inflationary gap at the time of
devaluation is almost certainly inconsistent with providing an atmosphere in
which altered incentives can induce resource reallocation; (2) tying the fate of
the devaluation package to the immediate reduction in the rate of domestic in-
flation may be unwise; and (3) domestic recession is not a necessary accom-
paniment to the Phase III transition.
In addition, devaluationitself has a macroeconomic impact and,
therefore, by implication requires that an appropriate policy be followed in
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pursuit of stabilizing aggregate demand. Obviously the effect of devaluation is
a function of circumstances specific to each country and of other factors ex-
pected to affect the level of economic activity. It seems most appropriate,
therefore, to frame the following question: If the authorities had decided upon
a desired level of economic activity and a monetary and fiscal policy to be
followed in order to attain it, how would a devaluation package alter the
monetary and fiscal policy that ought to be pursued?
A number of important findings that shed some light on the issue emerge
from the country studies. First, and perhaps most important, is the fact that
the macroeconomic impact will hinge critically on the behavior of imports in
the postdevaluation period. If import flows are greatly increased, the net im-
pact of devaluation will not be very inflationary, and indeed it can even be
deflationary.'8 If, on the other hand, devaluation is accompanied by a cutback
in the flow of imports, it is likely that inflationary pressures will result. As was
seen in Chapter 8, the combined outcome of all the factors influencing the
price level was not significantly inflationary for the countries covered by this
project, and it seems clear that the deflationary impact of increased flows of
imports has been underestimated on several occasions.
Second, there are a number of aspects of devaluation that affect the
government budget deficit. Raising tariff rates, for example, may increase
budget receipts and, in fact, tariff revenues will automatically increase with
devaluation if they are levied on an ad valorem basis and the flow of imports is
not drastically cut. In some countries, export taxes have been imposed on
traditional commodities in order to absorb the windfall gains that might other-
wise have occurred. The short-term use of such taxes may prove especially
beneficial if devaluation is undertaken when the crop is already in the hands of
middlemen. This policy can, however, be considered only for the short-term
period because of the necessity for increasing incentives for producers of tradi-
tional exports.
Third, a devaluation that is successful in increasing foreign exchange ear-
nings can, unless offsetting measures are taken, result in unwanted increases in
the money supply. To the extent that measures can be taken to sterilize the net
change in foreign exchange receipts, the impact of devaluation will be less in-
flationary, and the long-term prospects for sustained growth of foreign ex-
change earnings will be improved. A devaluation that is highly successful in in-
creasing foreign exchange receipts may also in the longer run prove highly in-
flationary if reserves are allowed to accumulate and the domestic monetary
base increases. To a certain extent such an outcome can be prevented by per-
mitting flows of imports to increase as foreign exchange receipts rise.
However, there are instances—especially when there is a very strong short-
term response—where additional measures would be required to prevent an
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sufficientto prevent a current account surplus might require strong temporary
measures to induce them and represent an uneconomic utilization of foreign
exchange receipts.
Finally, there is some evidence that devaluation and its accompanying
measures may affect the time-path of aggregate demand; the short-term im-
pact may be inflationary, but there may be a tendency toward deflation at a
later date. This would be most likely to occur in situations where an increased
import flow followed devaluation by several months; in fact, this might nor-
mally be expected because of delays between orders and delivery. In this case
an appropEiate monetary/fiscal policy stance might be somewhat restrictive in
anticipation of the devaluation and then turn somewhat easier after six months
(assuming that foreign exchange receipts are appropriately sterilized and that
due account is taken of the likely shift in the government budget).
On balance, however, the evidence strongly indicates that the impact of a
Phase III episode on the level of economic activity is far less inflationary than
has generally been assumed. The appropriate conclusion is probably that a
healthy skepticism should be maintained about any sizable impact of the Phase
III package on the level of economic activity, except when a sharp cutback in
imports accompanies devaluation. There are enough offsetting factors work-
ing in both directions that it would very likely require large changes in import
flows, in the exchange rate, or in other variables before it could be assumed
that the devaluation package would be a major factor in determining changes
in thelevel of economic activity or of prices.
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NOTES
I.There is also the problem that the costs are largely incurred before the benefits are forth-
coming.
2. Behrman, pp. 310-11.
3. Ernest Sturc stresses the importance of political consensus in his evaluation of the Fin-
nish, Spanish, and Turkish experiences. See his "Stabilization Policies: Experience of Some Euro.
pean Countries in the 1950's," !MFStaff Papers 15(July l968):l97-217.
4. Behrman, p. 298.
5. p. 207.
6. Leith did not cover the 197 1/72 episode in detail in his study. His comment was made in
correspondence with the author.
7. Chile's 1965 devaluation was followed by five years with a sliding peg. The causes of
failure are discussed below, but they center on overvaluation of the exchange rate.
8. Two of the cases—Brazil 1964 and Israel 1962—are nonetheless treated here as successes.
The fact that the Brazilian real rate was lower two years after the 1964 devaluation than it was a
year before points to Fislow's conclusion that the 1967 policy shifts were necessary for sustained
liberalization.r
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9. Indeed, there are bases on which it can be presumed that the appropriate real rate might
alter, quite aside from the obvious case of changes in the price of a major exportable. See, for ex-
ample, Michael Bruno, "Trade, Growth and Capital," Working Paper No. 65, Department of
Economics, M.I.T., 1970.
10. Behrman, pp. 295-96.Inaddition, the peg was not adjusted enough. In general the
changes in the rate were smaller than those in the price level, so that overvaluation increased over
time.
11. Israel also changed to a sliding peg late in. 1975, but that is well outside the scope of PARTIV
Michaely'sstudy and there is no evidence yet available about the effects of the system at this
writing.
Lb
12.Even though the authorities can control a great many transactions, there are still ways in erahze
whichspeculation can occur if it is sufficiently remunerative. For example, exporters can delay
shipments and compensation and importers can speed up their orders and payments. anconc
13.See Michaely, Chapter 4, Section 2, for a discussion of the dispersion in export rates in
Israel; and Frank, Kim, and Westphal, Chapter 10, Section 6, on the situation in South Korea. It
would appear that distortions in South Korea were probably greater than those in Israel.
14. See Frank, Kim, and Westphal, Chapter 7, for a discussion of the problems arising from
the two interest rates. After devaluation it became attractive to borrow from abroad, but as time
progressed, exchange rate uncertainty made the domestic market increasingly attractive, and
swings were introduced into Korea's capital account. Under a sliding peg the real rates would have
been equated, and such swings, with their resulting inefficiencies, would not have arisen.
15. South Korea's export growth has been so rapid that the real rate probably should have ap-
preciated. Frank, Kim, and Westphal found that the real rate was approximately optimal over the
period in question. See their Chapter 9.
16. It is important to distinguish subsidy schemes to stabilize the price of particular export
commodities from schemes to maintain the real exchange rate. Egypt had an automatic scheme for
maintaining a constant producer price of cotton in the 1950s, for example. That was aimed at in-
sulating the domestic economy from for,eign price fluctuations.
17. Even in that instance there seems little doubt that the huge inflow of imports was a signifi-
cant factor contributing to the rapid control of inflation.
18. It should be noted that this is one very important way in which devaluation differs be-
tween convertible regimes and exchange control regimes.
-